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Abstract 
This paper looks at the European Union (EU) process of engagement in the South Caucasus 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) in the context of its Neighborhood Policy. It looks at how 
divergent perceptions of the region, both inwards and outwards-driven, impact on regional  
policy choices, with an emphasis on regional cooperation. Though these states remark on the  
outlived  usefulness  of  artificial  framings,  and  regional  cooperation  among  the  three  is  
virtually non-existent, when engaged in larger and wide-ranging formats, cooperation might  
not  only  be possible,  but fruitful.  It  is  therefore argued that  regional  cooperation should 
overcome the  artificially  constructed  “South  Caucasus” regional  label  and unfold  along  
different  patterns  and  variable  compositions.  The  paper  advances  the  proposal  for  a  
Eurasian/Black  Sea  security  complex,  framing  in  a  wider  format  regional  bounds,  while  
maximizing them in new cooperation frames, inverting the tendency for imposed labels and  
uncooperative stances in the area.
Keywords:  European Neighborhood Policy,  South Caucasus, security complexes,  regional  
cooperation, Wider Black Sea
Introduction
The three South Caucasian states – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – have been widely 
regarded as a single regional group by external actors, including the European Union (EU). 
However, the argument has been put forward that such a regional perception has outlived its 
usefulness and can become counterproductive, by not recognizing neither long-standing nor 
recently renewed differences among these states. In addition, this regional labeling, clearly 
based  on  a  geographical  approach  to  the  area,  does  not  reflect  the  considerably  distinct 
realities of each country in political, economic and security terms. Therefore, it is argued here 
that these variations should be taken into consideration by external partners in their interplay 
and policy formulations towards the area. Nevertheless, and simultaneously,  the Caucasian 
context  reveals  high  levels  of  interdependence  in  matters  related  to  regional  conflicts, 
migration  fluxes,  ethnicity,  and economic  aspects,  particularly energy assets  and transport 
routes, as well as a shared past of territorial tearing and occupation. This helps explain why 
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the region is commonly described as a security subcomplex,1 within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) under the regional preeminence of the Russian Federation. It reveals 
overlapping  issues,  shared  concerns  and  inter-related  dimensions  of  actuation,  both  in 
equations of cooperation and rivalry,  demanding a common regional approach, though one 
that overcomes currently tight and formatted dealings. 
This article argues, therefore, that the artificial labeling of the South Caucasus does not reflect 
a cohesive regional group with easily identifiable linking ties among the regional players, but 
that  despite  this  fact,  the  reasoning  for  regional  cooperation  exists.  This  cannot  however 
involve exclusively Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, but should instead define itself in a 
multi-dimensional and multi-level format.  Here, the Wider Black Sea regional cooperation 
format emerges as an alternative to rigidity,  by introducing flexibility and allowing cross-
level inter-relations involving the three Caucasian states in cooperative arrangements.
By taking a varying regional approach, external actors activate ties that range across a wider 
region encompassing not only these three states,  but also Russia,  Turkey and Iran, which 
range  across  several  dimensions,  interplaying  in  instances  in  opposite  directions,  be  it 
regarding  religious,  linguistic  and  ethnic  affinities,  energetic  and  environmental  matters, 
military security or political linkages. The complexities underlying this multitude of factors 
have demanded a differentiated approach to the promotion of regional cooperation from the 
EU,  which  in  the  face  of  the  current  options  has  made  the  regional  cooperation  format 
rigidified and implying a conditional approach – pending the achievement of simultaneous 
goals. This implies a rationale for simultaneous action with all three states – hardly possible. 
Its  strict  sectioning  has  led  the  EU to overlook both the possible  destabilizing  effects  of 
outside actors, and the destabilizing impact of developments within this security subcomplex 
in neighboring countries. This might imply not only a slow response and the frustration of 
expectations,  but  also  the  blocking  of  synergies  emerging  from developing  cross-relation 
processes in the region. Thus, this analytical framing should encompass in its readings and 
formulation issues such as Turkey’s EU accession, the eventual membership of other Black 
Sea countries, the difficult partnership with Russia, and above all, the Neighborhood Policy 
engaging the Middle East and other Black Sea and Caspian basin states.   
In addition, this enlarged format for cooperation implies, as an underlining assumption, that 
the  South  Caucasus  security  subcomplex  might  in  fact  detangle  from the  wider  security 
complex where it  is  included,  the CIS, giving place to an independent,  though still  inter-
related, mini security complex in the area or eventually allowing for the establishment of a 
wider Eurasian/Black Sea security complex, not matching the increasingly disaggregated CIS. 
This  argument  reinforces  the  idea  put  forward  for  a  wider  regional  cooperation  format, 
beyond the traditionally devised formats, particularly within the EU framework, to address 
and respond to the challenges in the area. To this end, the paper analyses the varying patterns 
of regional affinities and cooperation, along with those of rivalry, in the post-Soviet period, 
and tracks the most significant changes manifesting in the current securitization context. It 
takes  into  consideration  the  possible  impact  of  other  actors  besides  the  EU  in  regional 
1
 Buzan, Barry and Waever, Ole, “Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security”, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 419. This understanding has been further questioned by Georgia’s request 
to withdraw from the CIS in August 2008.
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processes  and  maps  the  possible  obstacles  and  breakthroughs  in  regional  cooperation 
engaging the three South Caucasian countries.
The Dynamic Caucasian Security Complex
The security framework where relations among the three South Caucasus states – Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia – take place is a complex one. The regional conflicts, along with the 
intersection of competing outside interests in the area, make it a relevant case for the analysis 
of the potential for endogenous inter-regional cooperation among the three, which has been 
almost  inexistent,  and  certainly  for  enlarged  formats  of  regional  cooperation,  allowing 
innovative dealings engaging all states in the wider Black Sea area.
According to Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, a “security complex is defined as a set of states  
whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security  
problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another. The formative 
dynamics and structure of a security complex are generated by the states within that complex 
– by their security perceptions of, and interactions with, each other”.2 Within the CIS, the 
multifaceted institutional framework allowing competing dynamics renders the relationships 
among  these  states  difficult.  The  leading  role  of  the  Russian  Federation  in  the  complex 
renders it harsher, when asymmetrical bargaining/concessions relations take place, with close 
collaboration  with  Armenia,  a  wait-and-see-act  relationship  with  Azerbaijan,  and  very 
strained relations with Georgia. In addition, the long-standing conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh adds to difficult relations between these two countries, 
through constituting  the main  problem in their  mutual  security concerns.  And the overall 
instability in the area, demonstrated by the August 2008 war in Georgia, illustrates that the 
South Caucasus is an unstable playing field. Considering the area, it becomes clear that there 
are  differentiated  interplays  taking  place,  not  only  between  the  three  countries  of  this 
subcomplex, but also regarding external players that have effect on its dynamics, and that 
clearly go well beyond the strong presence of Russia. 
However, and despite this scenario of conflicting dynamics, not only is there an urgent need 
to recognize that interdependence exists among Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (with all 
difficulties entailed), but also that this is extended in fluid and dynamic patterns to include 
other  state  and  non-state  actors  varying  according  to  the  issues  at  stake.  Mapping  this 
mutating interdependence is a first step for regional actors to better assess their interests and 
design strategies accordingly. Furthermore, and since external actors also impact on local and 
regional dynamics, emerging institutional and ideational elements are important to understand 
how far local security rationales are changing and adjusting to, for instance, Western views, 
or if these are incompatible with alternative sources of regional legitimacy. This is why the 
South Caucasus has been often perceived as a security subcomplex,3 whose security concerns 
impact  on  relational  patterns  within  the  region  and  outside  it.  According  to  Buzan’s 
formulation, these “empirical phenomena” derive as much from interactions among individual 
states as they do from the anarchical system: on the one hand, geography links events in one 
2 Buzan, Barry; Weaver, Ole and Wilde, Jaap de, “Security: A New Framework for Analysis”, (Boulder: Lynne-
Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 12. Emphasis in the original.
3 Buzan, Barry and Waever, Ole, “Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security”, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 419-423
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state to the next, whilst  security interdependence is shaped by international  anarchy.4 The 
current challenges arising within Georgia, with the newly-recognized (by Russia) territories of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, along with the instability between Armenia and Azerbaijan, both 
influence  and  depend  not  only  on  the  countries  themselves,  but  also  on  neighbors,  and 
regional  and  global  powers  with  identified  interests  in  that  particular  region.  The 
differentiated  approaches  to  these  powers’  security,  including  conflict  management,  have 
pressed local actors and decision makers in their security calculations and political choices. 
Thus,  there  has been a clear  interlinkage  between domestic  policies  and externally-driven 
inputs in decision-making processes in the area. 
For the EU, dialogue and cooperation within a process of increasing regional integration is the 
most relevant form to address conflicting scenarios. Within the framework of the European 
Neighborhood Policy  (ENP),  the  EU has  sought  to  stabilize  the  South  Caucasus  through 
economic integration, institutional cooperation and by playing a growing role as a security 
actor in the region. But the EU has remained an outsider to the region’s frozen conflicts, on 
the basis that other actors are conducting the negotiation processes (the EU has been involved, 
at  most,  as  an  observer  and  eventual  future  guarantor  of  a  final  settlement  agreement), 
contrary to that of Turkey and Russia who have acted as both supporters and financers. This is 
a  central  aspect  the  EU  must  take  into  consideration  when  designing  its  strategies  and 
partnerships, both on conflict resolution and on a broader security level, as regards energy, 
transport and communication routes. 
Moreover, decisions in Ankara and Moscow regarding foreign relations towards the Caucasus 
do not always match the principles and means advocated by the EU. Turkey is on the path to 
deeper integration within Euro-Atlantic structures, but Russia has reversed its approximation 
course towards the West and has moved towards greater autonomy and affirmation in the 
“near abroad”. According to Roeder,5 relations within the post-Soviet security complex are 
constrained by “the political metric of survival in office and power” of most regional leaders, 
and  the  “disproportionate  power  of  Russia”  vis-à-vis its  “near  abroad”,  granting  it  a 
hegemonic feature. Both Turkey and Russia take part in the Caucasian subsecurity complex in 
different  modes,  but  in  both cases maintaining  a  security  relationship  with the Caucasian 
states,  with different  levels  of engagement  and demand,  particularly connected to conflict 
resolution and regional integration processes. Due to Iran’s international standing as a “pariah 
state”, the EU has been unable and unwilling to include it in its security analysis regarding 
this security complex. As Coppieters argues “the patterns of interaction among the political 
actors of the South Caucasian states are too closely linked with Russia, Turkey and Iran for 
them to be considered as constituting a separate region in security terms”.6 
A further example of these fluid and dynamic interactions can be taken from the impact that 
US  support  for  the  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan  (BTC)  pipeline  has  had  on  relations  between 
Armenia  and Azerbaijan.  The strategic  interests  of both the United  States  and the EU in 
4 Buzan, Barry, “People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War 
Era”, 2nd Ed., (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 191. 
5 Roeder, Philip G., “From Hierarchy to Hegemony: The Post-Soviet Security Complex”, in: David A. Lake and 
Patrick  M.  Morgan,  (eds)  “Regional  Orders:  Building  Security  in  a  New  World”  (Pennsylvania:  The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), pp. 220 and 230. 
6 Coppieters,  Bruno,  “An EU Special  Representative  to  a  new periphery”,  in:  Dov Lynch  (ed)  “The South 
Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU”, Chaillot Papers, 65, December 2003, p. 160.
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Caspian  energy  have  changed  the  balance  within  this  security  subcomplex  and  this  will 
certainly  have  spillover  effects  into  the  Black  Sea  region.  This  interdependence,  and  the 
identification of specific  interests  in the Wider Black Sea, has pushed regional  leaders to 
deepen cooperation and open up to outside influence. In fact, a multilateral security system 
complemented  by  the  engagement  of  transnational  institutions  such  as  the  Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council, or the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSECO), could 
enhance common perceptions of security and assure the existence of common frameworks of 
peace  enforcement.7 This  is  not,  however,  without  problems.  The expansion of the Euro-
Atlantic structures into the former Soviet space has sparked a great deal of frustration and 
animosity in Moscow, where this process is viewed as designed to offset Russian influence 
instead of engaging it  in a postmodern cooperative frameworks.  The outcome has been a 
significant security impact in the South Caucasus region.
Elements of Distinction and Lines of Approximation
Placed  in  a  border  region,  the  identities  and  cultures  of  the  peoples  living  in  Armenia, 
Azerbaijan  and  Georgia  have  been  continually  redefined,  along  with  their  territory  and 
political options. Even during their long inclusion in the Soviet empire, identity differences 
were kept  in  line  with  the  nationalities  policies  of  the  ruling  regime,  which latter  would 
become the basis for the nationalists’ political movements. The Armenian identity remains 
shaped  by  some  level  of  “siege”  mentality,  since  it  perceives  itself  as  surrounded  by 
aggressive Turkish and Persian Islamic cultures. This is an illustration of the impact that such 
a context had in forging a strong sense of ethnic and religious identity in the country.8 On the 
other hand, Azerbaijanis, living in their so-called khanates (statelet) established in the South 
Caucasus  and  the  present-day  Iran  before  the  Russian  expansion  in  the  19th century  into 
Caucasia,  became divided between those included in the Russian and Soviet Empires and 
those populating the north-western provinces of Iran. Close relations between Moscow and 
Teheran deepened after the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, at which point many Soviet 
Azerbaijanis crossed the border to meet their ethnic and religious countrymen inside Iran, 
shortly  reviving  the  idea  of  Grand-Azerbaijan.9 Georgia  displays  a  multi-ethnic  character 
close to the North Caucasus and its position on the eastern coast of the Black Sea provides it 
with an important sea link to the West.
The  years  of  Soviet  experience  bestowed  a  common  background  throughout  the  South 
Caucasus  and  the  remaining  former-Soviet  space.  This  common  inheritance  of  economic 
central planning and heavy subsidization left the new independent states poorly prepared  to 
provide for economic assurances to their citizens or for economic integration into a globalized 
world economy.  Moreover,  a “dual transition” was imposed on these states,  demanding a 
(re)creation of the functions of the state.10 From central  economic planning and one party 
politics,  the  expectation  was  for  the  new  independent  countries  to  become  multiparty 
7 Morgan, Patrick M., “Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders”, in: David A. Lake and Patrick M. 
Morgan, (eds) “Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World” (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1997), pp. 35-38.
8 Derluguian, Giorgi M., “Bordieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus. A World-System Biography”, (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 173-87. 
9 Maleki, Abbas, “What Iran is looking for in Central Asia and the Caucasus”, in: Heartland – Eurasian Review 
of Geopolitics, 4, 2005, p. 70.
51
CAUCASIAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
VOL. 2 (4) – AUTUMN 2008
© CRIA 2008
democracies with viable and integrated market economies. In the Caucasus, this scenario gave 
place to economic decline heightened by the escalation of violent armed conflicts,11 while in 
the political spectrum, early democratization trends were subverted by the radicalization of 
national  movements  in  the  face  of  armed  conflicts,  and  the  lack  of  positive  economic 
redistribution.12 
Historically  interdependent,  the  region  later  known  as  Transcaucasia  would  arrive  at 
independence in the 1990s with significant differences in the level of economic and human 
development,  which  together  with  relevant  differences  in  their  natural  geographical 
characteristics  (territorial  relief,  natural  resources,  access to  sea) would shape the modern 
development of these societies.13 Faced with the challenge of assuring economic and social 
welfare  to their  populations  and the challenge  of  consolidating  the political  transitions  to 
democratic forms of government,  the states of the South Caucasus face distinct paths and 
stand at different points in their transition processes. Although all three had reached economic 
stability  and  steady  economic  growth  by  the  end  of  the  1990s,14 their  prospects  vary 
considerably. Azerbaijan, sticking to a strong-hand-style of ruling, has grasped the benefits of 
high energy prices, making it a leading regional investor. However, its economy is highly 
dependent on energy exports. Armenia,  also in an authoritarian mood, has managed some 
level of specialization to overcome the geographical isolation it suffers from closed borders 
with  Azerbaijan  and  Turkey.  Nevertheless,  its  economy  still  relies  heavily  on  diaspora 
remittances,  conveying  to  these  groups  substantial  political  leverage,  especially  as  far  as 
regional  relations  and conflict  resolution  issues  are  concerned.  As  for  Georgia,  the  early 
reforms  brought  by  the  2003  “Rose  Revolution”  pro-democratization  government  curbed 
corruption and improved stability facilitating foreign investment, while tariffs from energy 
transit ensure higher revenues for the government. Nonetheless, relations with Russia have 
escalated into armed conflict,  jeopardizing both economic and political  reforms. These are 
fragile achievements that rely on the need for a stable regional environment and could be 
reinforced  by  deepening  political  reforms  and  engaging  in  wider  regional  cooperation 
frameworks, a challenge in need of analysis.
A major  point to remember while dealing with the South Caucasian states is their strategic 
location and geo-strategic potential. The region stands at a crossroads between Europe and 
Asia and between Russia and the Middle East, squeezed between the Black and the Caspian 
Seas. After the events of 9/11 the South Caucasus was brought back to mainstream politics in 
the West, with the region playing a crucial role in logistical support to allied operations in 
Afghanistan.  This  increased  geopolitical  competition  among  foreign  powers  for  gaining 
10 Graham, Norman A., “Introduction and Overview”, in Norman A. Graham and Folke Lindahl (eds), “The 
Political  Economy  of  Transition  in  Eurasia.  Democratization  and  Economic  Liberalization  in  a  Global 
Economy”, (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2006), pp. 1-41.
11 Cornell, Svante E. and Starr, S. Frederick, “The Caucasus: A challenge for Europe”, in: Silk Road Paper, June 
2006, p. 35.
12 Parrott, Bruce, “Perspectives on Postcommunist Democratization”, in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds), 
“Conflict, cleavage, and change in Central Asia and the Caucasus”, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), pp. 1-39. 
13 Ismailov, Eldar and Esenov, Murad, “Central Asia in the New Geopolitical and Geo-economic Dimensions”, 
in “Central Eurasia 2005 Analytical Annual” (Sweden: CA&CC Press, 2006), pp. 11-12.
14 European Commission, “Armenia Country Report” SEC(2005) 285/3, Brussels, 2005; European Commission 
“Azerbaijan  Country  Report”  SEC(2005)  286/3,  Brussels,  2005;  European  Commission,  “Georgia  Country 
Report”, SEC(2005) 288/3, Brussels, 2005. 
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influence in the region, providing new opportunities for the governments in Tbilisi, Baku and 
Yerevan.  Their  choices  were  constrained  by  the  security  environment  inherited  from the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, namely the ethno-political conflicts and the action of external 
powers by proxy, particularly Russia, Iran and Turkey. 
However, as security alignments shifted after the end of the Cold War and after 9/11, each 
South  Caucasian  state  perceived  its  security  differently.  As  Svante  Cornell  argues 
“international interest in the region tended to increase polarisation of regional politics”.15 The 
rivalry between the United States and Russia is here a good example, clearly endowing the 
foreign policy decisions of regional leaders with strategic calculations about their security. 
“This US-Russian pattern of cooperative/competitive relationship creates a very precarious 
stability in the South Caucasus, because neither the strategic alliances are durable, nor do they 
create dividing lines along which a balance of power situation could be consolidated. While 
all three countries, and to some extent the autonomous units, do have some space for strategic 
maneuverings,  it  is  the global  US-Russian interplay that  strongly conditions  the decision-
making process for each actor in the complex”.16
Turkey – a  long time Western ally and member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) – has also been showing signs of growing awareness regarding its security needs, 
particularly after the 2003 war in Iraq.17 Pragmatism and a growing role in regional affairs 
have driven its external relations, at a time of dramatic changes and dilemmas at home. Either 
through cultural,  linguistic and ethnic affinities shared with countries in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, or the geographical importance of its territory, Ankara has assumed a leading 
regional role. BSECO, a Turkish initiative, has become the most important forum of regional 
cooperation in the Black Sea. This is recognized by the EU (the European Commission is in 
the process of becoming an observer to BSECO) and the United States, which is already an 
observer. The most recent Turkish-led initiative for the South Caucasus followed the Russian 
military intervention in Georgia, with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan putting forward 
a revived idea of a Stability Pact for the Caucasus.18 This pro-active Turkish stance in its 
vicinity has been particularly welcomed and supported by both the EU and the United States, 
while Moscow has retained a wait-and-see stance.
Iran is fundamentally perceived as a security threat for the Wider Black Sea region. Despite 
early unilateral attempts to play a mediating role in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict,19 Iran was 
left out of the main negotiation format – the Minsk Group –, since it is not a member of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Furthermore, although Iran has 
considerable energy reserves, its strained international position and the development of its 
nuclear program have made it a non-reliable partner for the South Caucasus states. Despite 
15 Cornell, Svante, “NATO’s Role in South Caucasus Regional Security”, in: Turkish Foreign Policy Quarterly, 
vol. 3:2, 2004, p. 126.
16 Derghoukassian,  Khatchik,  “Balance  of  Power,  Democracy  and  Development:  Armenia  in  the  South 
Caucasian Regional Security Complex”, in: AIPRG Working Paper, vol. 10, January 2006, p. 10.
17 Katik, Mevlut, “Geopolitical competition heats up in Black Sea”, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 10 2006, 
www.eurasianet.org, accessed on March 14 2006; Torbakov, Igor, “Turkey's strategic outlook making significant 
shift”, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 7 2006, www.eurasianet.org, accessed on March 14 2006.
18 Kanbolat, Hasan, “What is Caucasian stability and cooperation? What can Turkey do in the Caucasus?”, in: 
Today's Zaman, August 20 2008, http://www.todayszaman.com/, accessed on August 22 2008.
19 Ter-Gabrielian,  Gevrok  and Nedolian,  Ara,  “Armenia:  crossroads or  fault  line of  civilizations?”,  in:  The 
International Spectator, XXXII:2, April-June 1997, pp. 109-10.
53
CAUCASIAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
VOL. 2 (4) – AUTUMN 2008
© CRIA 2008
the religious differences, friendly relations between Yerevan and Teheran have provided both 
countries with alternatives to isolation, and Moscow’s blessing of Iranian engagement in the 
South  Caucasus  and  Central  Asia,  in  the  early  1990s,  was  meant  to  act  as  a  balance  to 
increasing Turkish influence.20 Today, relations between the two countries have improved. On 
July 14, 2007, Iran and Turkey signed a Memorandum of Understanding on oil and gas transit 
and joint investments, which was widely praised as a fundamental move to diversify supplies 
to Europe.21 
In this complex scenario of wide external involvement, competing interests and cooperation 
opportunities, the EU role and contribution for stability building and enhanced collaboration 
at the regional level is here the focus of analysis. The following section looks at the European 
Union  approach  to  the  South  Caucasus,  with  a  focus  on  the  regional  dimensions  of  the 
European Neighborhood Policy, identifying limits and possibilities in a turbulent context. 
Integrating the South Caucasus through the Neighborhood Policy? 
The EU has regarded the South Caucasus as a compact and interdependent area demanding a 
regional approach.  Since their independence in 1991, and following this rationale,  the EU 
engaged  with  Armenia,  Georgia  and Azerbaijan  in  a  highly  coordinated  way,  looking  at 
involvement with these countries in simultaneous terms. All three states signed a Partnership 
and  Cooperation  Agreement  (PCA),  which  entered  into  force  in  July  1999,  and  the  EU 
established a regional delegation of the European Commission in Tbilisi,  dealing with all 
relevant regional issues.22 The post of a Special Representative for the South Caucasus was 
created  in  2003, envisaging  a  coordinated implementation  of  EU policy objectives  in  the 
region.  Moreover,  the  European Parliament  established,  in  the  framework  of  the  PCA,  a 
Parliamentary Cooperation Committee dealing with the three countries simultaneously.23 The 
ENP, despite its differentiated approach, once again reinforced a regional perspective of the 
South Caucasus. This approach was maintained throughout negotiations for the bilateral ENP 
Action Plans and,  to  the  detriment  of the countries’  expectations,  the three were adopted 
simultaneously in November 2006.24 The reasoning underlying this similitude approach shows 
the concern in Brussels to avoid accusations of discrimination as much as it tried to underline 
20 Rashid, Ahmed, “The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?”, (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 
212-213.
21 This agreement could place Turkey as a central energy transit and trading country, while it also allows Iran to 
escape isolation imposed by the United States sanctions. It provides an important alternative energy supply for 
Europe,  away  from  Russian  dominated  routes,  and  makes  Caspian  export  routes  more  viable  allowing 
Turkmenistan’s  energy  to  flow  directly  to  Europe  without  using  Russian  controlled  pipelines.  Finally,  it 
represents  an  important  reinforcement  of  the  EU-sponsored  Nabucco  project.  See  among  others,  Socor, 
Vladimir, “Turkey Offers Route to Europe for Iranian and Turkmen Gas”, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 4:140, 
July 19 2007 and Daily, John C. K., “Turkey Moves to Position Itself as a Strategic Transit Corridor for Caspian 
Hydrocarbons”, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 4:161, August 17 2007.
22 Only in 2008 did the European Commission establish two permanent delegations in Yerevan and Baku, also in 
a coordinated way. 
23 This Committee was established in 1994, during negotiations for the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. 
In 2004, bilateral EU-Armenia, EU-Azerbaijan and EU-Georgia Parliamentary Cooperation Committees were 
created, reflecting the principle of differentiation underlying the ENP. 
24 EU-Armenia ENP Action Plan; EU-Azerbaijan ENP Action Plan; EU-Georgia ENP Action Plan, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm .
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the advantages of the regional cooperation format, where confidence-building measures could 
develop and thus facilitate conflict resolution processes.25
Among the European member-states, however, consensus as to what sort of approach should 
be  designed  towards  the  region  has  been  difficult.  As  Damien  Helly  argues,  different 
understandings of the South Caucasus have informed the EU’s attempts to devise a strategy of 
engagement.26 Further constraints on the EU’s action include its foreign policy system and 
disagreement  over  decision-making  competencies  and  priorities;  the  integration  of  EU 
policies in the context of Western institutions,  namely NATO and the OSCE, where great 
discrepancies reside; as well as the difficulty of creating a common space of understanding 
between the EU, Russia, the United States and the countries in the region. Despite the fact 
that the ENP represents an attempt to render greater autonomy to EU actions in the regions 
surrounding its enlarged borders, it remains prey to these constraints. 
The ENP is based on the principle of shared values, differentiation and ownership, making the 
EU’s partner states the major actor responsible for the pace of integration with the Union.27 
The classical dilemma of maintaining a viable regional approach, while differentiating enough 
to  allow partners  to  introduce  their  own rhythms of  reform,  has made the  EU subject  to 
criticism. Underlying the obvious differences and the obstacles to regional cooperation (most 
of all  the Nagorno Karabakh conflict),  leaders in the South Caucasus have pointed to the 
inefficiencies of linking developments in one country,  to the pace of reforms in the other, 
since it  does not respond to their  short-term needs.28 On the eve of the conclusion of the 
negotiations on the ENP Action Plans for the three South Caucasian states, an Azerbaijani 
commercial  airline  flew  to  the  Turkish  Cypriot  republic,  in  violation  of  the  EU’s  non-
recognition policy. As a reprisal, negotiations on the Action Plans for Armenia and Georgia 
were suspended along with the one for Azerbaijan.  This was denounced by authorities  in 
Yerevan  and  Tbilisi  as  an  unjustified  and  counterproductive  conditioning  of  the  EU’s 
relations  with  the  two  partners.29 Similarly,  the  European  Commission  decided  that  the 
opening of a full-fledged delegation in Baku would also be coordinated with the opening of a 
delegation in Yerevan.30 These instances demonstrate the EU’s awareness of the constraints 
imposed on cooperation efforts by the current regional situation, and its wish to be perceived 
as a balanced and neutral partner.
From a  Euro-Atlantic  integration  perspective,  forcing  some  level  of  regional  cooperation 
among Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis was a priority for the EU,31 in an attempt to 
25 Interviews with European Commission officials at the European Commission Delegation in Tbilisi, May 2006; 
with Ambassador Per Eklund, Head of the European Commission Delegation to Georgia, Tbilisi, May 7 2007, 
and with Giuseppe Busini, Desk Officer for Azerbaijan, European Commission, Brussels, July 10 2007. 
26 Helly,  Damien “EU policies  in  the South Caucasus”,  paper  presented  at  the conference  “L’Europe et  le  
Caucase du Sud/Europe and the South Caucasus”, Baku, July 11 2001, pp. 3-4. 
27 European  Commission,  “Communication  from  the  Commission  on  the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy 
Strategy Paper”, COM(2004)373 final, Brussels, May 12 2004.
28 Lobjakas,  Ahto,  “South  Caucasus:  Prospects  for  Regional  Stability  Pact  Recede”,  in:  Radio  Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), May 12 2006, http://www.rferl.org, accessed on June 19 2006. 
29 Freire, Maria Raquel and Simão, Licínia “The EU's Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Caucasus: 
Searching for Commonalty in a Patchy Scenario”, in:  Comparative Constitutional Review Journal, vol. 4:57, 
2006, pp. 36-44 (in Russian).
30 “Office  of  European  Commission  inaugurated  in  Baku,  Azerbaijan”,  in:  Today.Az,  February  5  2008, 
http://www.today.az/news/politics/42880.html, accessed on February 5 2008. 
31 Interview with Giuseppe Busini, Desk officer for Azerbaijan, European Commission, Brussels, July 10, 2007.
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avoid a new “Cyprus scenario”.32 This was seen as a necessary step to stimulate confidence 
among actors, searching for common values and objectives that the entrance into a new “ENP 
family”  could help forge.  The EU had established by then that  good neighborly relations 
would be at  the heart  of any attempt  to integrate  the South Caucasus  countries,  and that 
regional  cooperation would certainly precede any future attempts  at  regional  integration.33 
Furthermore, the EU reasoned that by presenting an attractive offer to the Caucasian partners, 
and having Georgia as a frontrunner, some level of peer competition could develop that would 
help  sustain  efforts  towards  regional  dialogue  and  mutual  commitments.34 However,  the 
national conditions, and the fact that Georgia’s revolutionary model was not welcomed by the 
current  Armenian  and  Azerbaijani  leaderships,  soon  toned  down  any  level  of  open 
competition, and allowed instead some level of free riding. 
During negotiations for the Action Plans, issues of regional cooperation arose from the three 
Caucasian partners, but naturally pointing in divergent directions, reflecting the fragmented 
nature of regional relations. For Azerbaijan, the insistence of the European Commission in 
having them cooperate with Armenia was seen as unwanted interference in domestic issues. 
Baku’s reply was to indicate a different format of this “region” to include neighbors such as 
Iran, with whom the EU has very limited and difficult relations. The EU’s alternative was 
therefore to maintain a “constructive ambiguity” in the definition of the scope for regional 
cooperation.35 For Georgia, a similar position developed, pointing out that because Armenia 
and Azerbaijan did not cooperate, any attempt to link integration into Euro-Atlantic structures 
to regional South Caucasian cooperation would be unfair to Georgian efforts. A Georgian 
official  noted that  “the [European]  Commission  is  very comfortable  with regional  formal 
structures, but the political issues end up being sacrificed over technical ones”.36 As far as 
Armenia was concerned, the engagement of the EU was the perfect opportunity to lobby for 
inclusion in regional projects and limit, to some extent, its isolation.37 
Alternatively, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia put forward different regional cooperation 
frameworks  that  represented  their  interests  better.  These  formats  reflect  the  strategic 
calculations  informing  domestic  and  foreign  policy  in  the  South  Caucasus.  Georgia  was 
extremely active in pushing for a format where its European identity would be underlined. 
With the 2004 enlargement the EU became a Black Sea power and after the “revolutionary” 
events  in  Georgia,  in  2003,  and in  Ukraine,  in  2004,  the  EU was compelled  to  define a 
strategy for its eastern neighborhood to be developed in a multilateral framework. Turkish and 
Russian participation within BSECO turned this forum into a wider regional  initiative for 
cooperation,  and  one  where  the  United  States  has  an  observer  status  and  the  European 
Commission is also engaged. Georgia pressed the EU during ENP Action Plan negotiations to 
include  a  reference  to  the  Black  Sea  cooperation,  making  the  argument  that  the  EU has 
32 Interview with Kestutis Jankauskas, Lithuanian Ambassador to COPS, Brussels, July 19, 2007. 
33 The development of a Stability Pact for the South Caucasus has been on the European agenda since 1999, 
through the European Parliament. In  2000 the Brussels-based think tank Centre for European Policy Studies 
released a publication on the Stability Pact for the South Caucasus,  where regional  integration was included 
though with limited political  backing.  See Celac,  Sergiu,  et  al.,  “A Stability Pact  for the South Caucasus”, 
(Brussels: Centre for European policy Studies, 2000).
34 Interview with Gunnar Viegand, acting responsible for Eastern Europe, Russia, South Caucasus and Central 
Asia at the European Commission, July 20, 2007.
35 Interview with Giuseppe Busini, Desk officer for Azerbaijan, European Commission, Brussels, July 10, 2007.
36 Interview with Archil Karaulashvili, Head of Euro-Integration Department at the Georgian State Ministry for 
Euro and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Tbilisi, May 4, 2006.
37 Interview with Silvia Maria Zehe, Desk Officer for Armenia, European Commission, Brussels, July 10, 2007.
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strategic interests in the region and that Georgia and the South Caucasus are part and parcel of 
those interests.  With time,  Azerbaijan and Armenia both regarded the Black Sea regional 
cooperation, hosted within BSECO, as the most viable alternative for constructive regional 
dialogue. This was also a necessary step to appease the European partners who were eager to 
promote regional dialogue. Azerbaijan, despite not being a Black Sea country, understood the 
gains it could derive from such an enlarged regional format, stretching from the Caspian to 
the Mediterranean, and therefore with large strategic potential. BSECO, being a Turkish-led 
initiative,  also  provided  authorities  in  Baku with  an  added  layer  of  comfort  for  regional 
cooperation,  and  it  would  prove Azerbaijani  dedication  to  supporting  its  strategic  ally  in 
Ankara.38 Finally,  for  Armenia,  BSECO represents  the most  important  regional  format  in 
which it participates, despite Turkish influence.39 Nevertheless, due to Russian participation 
and US and EU engagement,  Armenia feels more reassured of a balanced format. For the 
European Commission, the Wider Black Sea encapsulates the potential for diluting regional 
pressures and provides the necessary venues for dialogue. This meant streamlining its own 
instruments  designed for  the  region,  ranging  from membership,  accession,  ENP,  stability 
pacts, environmental and trafficking control – what its communication of 11 April 2007 calls 
a Black Sea Synergy.40 
The Wider Black Sea Regional Cooperation: Current Dynamics and Future 
Prospects
Euro-Atlantic integration processes represent today the most important challenge to the status  
quo in the Black Sea region, providing the impetus for regional cooperation and the formation 
of  a  regional  identity.41 Regional  cooperation  initiatives  which  derived  from  exogenous 
factors can now be sustained by local actors, building on their overlapping membership within 
the  EU,  NATO  and  BSECO.  Established  under  Turkish  initiative  in  1992,  BSECO was 
modeled after EU institutional cooperation templates, looking at economic cooperation as a 
stepping stone for institutionalized dialogue and common perceptions to develop. The process 
was strongly influenced by Turkish accession negotiations with the EU, and reinforced by the 
presence  of  Greece,  an  EU  member-state,  as  well  as  several  potential  candidates.  This 
momentum for Western influence in the Wider Black Sea region, initiated after the fall of the 
USSR,  focused  on  several  axes  of  action,  ranging  from  the  development  of  democratic 
institutions, good governance and rule of law practices – extending the political and economic 
systems established in Western Europe to the former Warsaw Pact states - to the energy and 
transportation interests that this hub region represents. A notable exception, both in BSECO 
and  in  bilateral  cooperation  between  the  EU and  regional  states,  has  been  hard  security 
concerns linked to the “frozen” conflicts in Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, 
after 9/11, the rigid positions of some BSECO members in having the organization deal with 
hard security issues changed, as the Istanbul Summit of 2002 testifies.42 
38 Interview with Azerbaijani officials, Brussels, March 27, 2007.
39 Interview with Paruyr Hovhannisyan, Counselor at the Armenian Embassy, Brussels, March 21, 2007.
40 European  Commission,  “Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  to  the  European 
Parliament: Black Sea Synergy – a new regional cooperation initiative”, COM(2007) 160 final, Brussels, April 
11, 2007.
41 Aydin, M., “Europe’s next shore: The Black Sea region after EU enlargement”, in: EU Institute for Strategic 
Studies Occasional Papers, 53, June 20, 2004.
42 BSECO,  “Istanbul  Decennial  Summit  Declaration  –  Looking  Beyond  Ten  Years  of  Cooperation  and 
Progress”, http://www.bsec-organization.org/documents/declaration/summit/Reports/Istanbul2002.pdf .
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The reconfiguration of power relations in the Black Sea region has favored an entrenchment 
of European and North-American interests to the detriment of Russian influence. The process 
of collapse of the USSR and the endemic insecurity that followed this collapse was matched 
by  the  expansion  of  Euro-Atlantic  structures,  as  an  answer  to  growing  interdependence. 
Simultaneously,  domestic  changes  in  the  countries  of  the  region,  notably  in  Georgia  and 
Ukraine following the electoral processes in 2003 and 2004, as well as in Bulgaria, Romania 
and Turkey, accentuated a rupture with previous methods of government and established a 
firm Euro-Atlantic foreign policy orientation.43 With the launching of the ENP, the EU took 
wider responsibilities in the Black Sea region, pledging to support reforms and integration 
into its market and institutional structures. For the South Caucasus countries, uncomfortable 
with a strict regional approach, consolidating the process of Euro-Atlantic integration in the 
context  of  the  Black  Sea  cooperation  was  a  sensible  choice  for  different  reasons.  The 
European Commission’s April 2007 communication on “Black Sea Synergy: A new regional 
cooperation initiative” underlines the potential  for increased cooperation with the EU in a 
series of matters, underlining the need for regional efforts to deal with the challenges posed 
by weak institutional structures and governance procedures in the region, organized crime and 
illegal  migration,  the  “frozen”  conflicts,  energy  security,  transportation  networks,  and 
environmental distress, among other priorities.44 This structural foreign policy, embedded in 
the EU’s domestic  processes, creates the promise of replication of its own prosperity and 
stability beyond its borders, and alters the current security configurations in the region. This is 
strategically reinforced by the twin enlargement of NATO to Eastern Europe and potential 
membership  negotiations  with  Ukraine  and  Georgia,  among  others,  extending  security 
guarantees to the region that the EU is unable and/or unwilling to provide. 
As far as Russia is concerned, this is a hazardous process, both due to its lack of transparency 
and because Moscow does not participate in the decision making structures. Under President 
Putin, Russia sought to improve its relations with NATO and the US in an attempt to redesign 
the balance of power around the Black Sea and within the CIS. The military cooperation that 
followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, nevertheless, represented a pragmatic 
assessment of the current interests and possibilities more than a long-term prospect of solid 
partnership between the West and Russia. Even the EU was unable to fully associate Russia to 
its  process  of  enlargement  in  2004,  following a  failed  and  embarrassing  attempt  to  give 
substance to the “four common spaces”.45 A growing ideological gap developed as Russia 
centralized  its  political  and economic  structures  in  the Kremlin,  following a “petro-state” 
model,46 and as the EU insisted in extending its “fuzzy” politics to what Moscow perceives as 
43 Cornell, Svante, et al., “The Wider Black Sea Region: An Emerging Hub in European Security”, in: Silk Road 
Paper, December 20 2006.
44 European  Commission,  “Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  to  the  European 
Parliament:  Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional  Cooperation Initiative”,  COM(2007) 160 final, Brussels, 
2007.
45
 “EU-Russia: Road Map for the 4 Common Spaces”, Working Document, 15th EU-Russia Summit, Moscow, 
May  10  2005,  http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/documents_travail/2005/05/10-4spaces/index.html, 
accessed on August 20 2008.
46 Alexandrova-Arbatova,  Nadia,  “Troubled  Strategic  Partnership:  The  Black  Sea  Dimension  of  Russia’s 
relations with the West”, in: Daniel Hamilton and Gerhard Mangott (eds),  The Wider Black Sea Region in the 
21st Century.  Strategic,  Economic  and  Energy  Perspectives,  (Washington,  D.C.:  Centre  for  Transatlantic 
Relations, 2008), p. 298.
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its  sphere  of  influence47 –  all  together,  a  common  language  was  missing  from which  a 
strategic  partnership  could  emerge.  The  latest  development  in  this  strategic  gap  came  in 
August 2008 with the Russian incursion into South Ossetia and Georgia. The official views of 
this short conflict diverge. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin described the war with Georgia and the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a 
need, a last resort option, and a response to a provocation from the Georgian side.48 The Bush 
administration and some of the EU member states like the United Kingdom, Sweden, Poland 
and  the  Baltic  states  have  seen  Russian  intervention  outside  its  borders  as  a  return  to 
imperialist  policies;  actions  with  fundamental  consequences  for  Moscow.49 For  the  EU, 
however, the attempt has been to maintain open venues for dialogue throughout the turmoil, 
as  the  mediation  efforts  by  French  President  Nicholas  Sarkozy  indicate.50 Whatever  the 
intended  results  of  this  conflict,  it  seems  neither  to  have  slowed or  dampened  the  Euro-
Atlantic aspirations of both Ukraine and Georgia nor to sprout the alignment of the CIS and 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization member-states with Russia.51   
The security concerns of the South Caucasian states have become more acute in this process, 
but they have not necessarily become more reliant on Russia. Maintaining the CIS security 
complex through military intervention might yield results in the short-term, as Azerbaijan’s 
revised  policy  of  support  for  the  Nabucco  pipeline  suggests.52 Nevertheless,  the  ongoing 
processes of integration and alignment with the EU and its institutions will be very hard to 
revert or avoid, as long as the EU is seen as a coherent and reliable partner. Even Armenia, a 
long time Russian ally, has taken the opportunity presented by the ENP to come closer to the 
EU, opening new possibilities for strategic cooperation. Improving relations with Turkey is 
47 Allison, Roy, et al., “Putin’s Russia and the Enlarged Europe”, (London: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), p. 85.
48 Medvedev, Dmitri, “Why I had to recognise Georgia’s breakaway regions”, in:  Financial Times, August 26 
2008.  Putin, Vladimir, “Nicholas Sarkozy a joué un grand rôle de pacification”, in:  Le Figaro, September 13 
2008. 
49
 David Milband, United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, stated that “The sight of Russian tanks rolling into part 
of a sovereign country on its neighbouring borders will have brought a chill to the spine of many people, rightly, 
because that is a reversion to – it’s not just Cold War politics, it’s a 19th Century way of doing politics.” See 
“Russia  warned  over  ‘Soviet  past’”,  in:  BBC  News, August  13  2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7557887.stm,  accessed  on  August  20,  2008.  A joint 
statement by Poland and the three Baltic states reads “The EU and NATO must take the initiative and stand up 
against  the spread of  imperialist  and revisionist  policy in  the east  of Europe...  The Russian Federation has 
overstepped a red line.” See “EU preparing snap summit on Russia-Georgia war”, in:  EUObserver, August 10 
2008. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made the following statements at a meeting with EU foreign 
ministers  at  the United Nations:  “We needed to  work together  so that  Russia’s  attack on Georgia does  not 
succeed in destroying Georgia’s sovereignty and that Russia comes to realize sooner or later – hopefully sooner – 
that attempts to change international borders through force is a grave mistake.” See “Russian Neighbors Urge 
U.N.  to  Stand  against  Kremlin  Aggression”,  in:  The  New  York  Times,  September  24  2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/25/world/europe/25nations.html, accessed on September 25 2008. 
50 “Europe taking a diplomatic approach to Caucasus conflict”, in:  International Herald Tribune, August  11 
2008, www.iht.com, accessed on August 20 2008. 
51
 “Former  Soviet  Sphere  Shocked  into  Silence  by  Conflict  in  Georgia”,  in:  RFE/RL,  August  11  2008, 
www.rferl.org, accessed on August 20, 2008; “China fails to support Kremlin”, in: The Financial Times, August 
29 2008. 
52 “Dick  Cheney  Mistakenly  Staked  on  Caspian”,  in:  Kommersant,  September  5  2008, 
http://www.kommersant.com/p1020720/Ilham_Aliyev_reluctant_to_fully_support_America/,  accessed  on 
September 6 2008. 
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another Armenian priority, with important security implications, and it is in the framework of 
Turkish EU-accession that a diversification of relations – away from Moscow – will naturally 
come about for Yerevan. Despite the heavy consequences for the Azerbaijani economy of the 
stoppage of the oil export because of the explosion in the Turkish part of the BTC oil pipeline 
shortly before the Georgian war and bombing by Russian armed forces of the railroad linking 
Baku to Tbilisi during the conflict,  authorities in Baku still  regard this western route as a 
strategic asset in their independence from Moscow, and cooperation with the EU, the United 
States and Turkey will certainly follow. Baku has become an important asset in EU attempts 
to reach oil and gas in Central Asia, making Azerbaijan’s territory a central element in the 
development of a new Trans-Caspian Trans-Black Sea energy corridor.
All these elements reinforce the argument for the detachment of the South Caucasus states 
from the  CIS  security  complex  towards  a  broader  Eurasian/Black  Sea  security  complex. 
Energy security seems,  at  this  point,  to  be the main  rationale  for cooperation  both at  the 
regional  level  (between Turkey,  Georgia,  Azerbaijan,  Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan),  and 
including the EU, the United States,  Russia and China.  Because energy development  is a 
long-term endeavor,  it  can be expected that the security links among these actors will  be 
reinforced, further shaping the Eurasian security complex. Conflict resolution and separatist 
trends  are  also  a  crucial  element  bringing  the  Eurasian  states  such  as  Georgia,  Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUAM) together. To the extent that these concerns overlap with 
energy issues, we might expect the security complex to be reinforced. A further aspect of this 
security  complex  is  the  democratization  process  associated  with  the  expansion  of  Euro-
Atlantic structures. A problem might arise to the extent that states throughout the Eurasian 
security complex can see their efforts and ambitions frustrated by the weak flexibility of these 
structures, and this will certainly have its own internal consequences for the EU and NATO. 
Insofar  as  these  issues  overlap,  the  configuration  of  this  security  complex  will  change 
accordingly. However, the South Caucasus stands at the heart of all these issues and will be 
crucial for cohesion of the security complex as well as regarding attempts to diffuse tensions 
within it. 
Conclusion
The future of regional stability in the South Caucasus depends on the delicate balance of 
interests and perceptions among different levels of interaction. Stable and strong central state 
institutions must accommodate the wishes and historical memories of the autonomous regions 
(South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh, to name the most unstable). These same 
institutions  must  lay  the  ground  for  regional  dialogue  and  cooperation,  based  on  mutual 
understandings. This would reinforce the region’s global position vis-à-vis external players.53 
In  the  absence  of  these  conditions,  frail  and  often  undemocratic  institutions  and political 
processes have jeopardized the construction of a common framework for development and 
stability where citizens, sub-regional and national leaders could build a common future that 
could  overcome competing  interests,  both  at  home and abroad.  The  reliance  on  strategic 
alliances that has so far kept a balance of power in the South Caucasus is a dangerous game, 
delivering only  Potemkin-like stability.  It is therefore essential for the region’s stability to 
frame it in a wider security complex that corresponds and responds to the area’s interlinked 
53 Suleymanov, Elin, “Emergence of new Political Identity in the South Caucasus. Energy, Security, Strategic 
Location and Pragmatism”, Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Thesis, The Fletcher School, May 21 2004. 
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problems  and  opportunities,  by  allowing  wider  formats  of  cooperation,  that  despite 
asymmetries  better  address  the  regional  challenges.  The  proposal  advanced  here  for  an 
Eurasian/Black Sea security complex could fit well the region’s multifaceted dealings, while 
overcoming the mounting difficulties associated with the CIS as an aggregator of security 
perceptions, concerns and needs of the very different states involved, and which to a great 
extent surpass the Commonwealth boundaries. 
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